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Pain and Pleasure in Plato’s
Physiology 
George Couvalis and Matthew Usher
We trace the development of Plato’s physiology of pleasure and pain 
from a rudimentary account in the Gorgias to a sophisticated account 
in the Philebus. In the earlier account Plato treats pains as lacks and 
pleasures as replenishments. In the later account he treats pleasures 
and pains as in part object directed mental states. In particular, he 
treats pains as perceptions of disintegrated states which lack deter-
minate being. We argue that Plato’s later account constitutes a consid-
erable advance on previous theories of pain and on his own earlier 
theory. However, we point out that modern research has shown that 
Plato is wrong to identify pains with perceptions of disintegrated 
states. Nevertheless, we suggest that had Plato known about the results 
of modern research, he would have been able to say that pains are per-
ceptions of threats of disintegration into the indeterminate.
Introduction
A number of Plato’s dialogues contain discussions of pleasure and pain. 
Plato is primarily interested in the nature of pleasure and pain because 
he wants to discuss the relative merits of two theories of the nature 
of the good, one which holds that it is ἡδονή (pleasure) and the other 
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which holds that it is τό φρονεῖν, τό νοεῖν (wisdom or thinking). In the 
Philebus, which presents Plato’s most sophisticated story about pleasure 
and pain, Socrates makes a number of claims about the good. At 20d, 
he claims that the good is something τέλεον (ﬁ nished, no further ad-
dition is possible) and ἱκανόν (suﬃ  cient in that it lacks nothing).1 He 
says that it is the whole and complete fulﬁ lment of desire, something 
which is the aim of any creature that apprehends it. Socrates argues 
that pleasure as such cannot be the good (and pain the bad). On the 
view he presents the human good includes certain kinds of pleasure, 
but thought is the more important ingredient. To defend this view, 
Plato relies on both a metaphysical and a physiological theory of the 
nature of pleasure and pain. We will be focussing on his physiological 
account of the nature of pain.
Plato holds that pain is painful 
due to a belief-like component that 
it contains, not due to its sensory 
character. Th is claim initially strikes 
us as grossly implausible. However, 
in a previous paper in Greek Research 
in Australia we argued that modern 
research has provided some evi-
dence for it (Couvalis and Usher, 
2003a; see also Couvalis and Usher, 
2003b). In that paper, we did not dis-
cuss Plato’s physiology in any detail. 
We will now trace the development 
of Plato’s physiology from a rudi-
mentary account in the Gorgias to 
a sophisticated story in the Philebus. 
1 We have followed the normal convention of referring to passages in Plato, which is to 
refer to the page numbers and column letters of the standard edition of the works of 
Plato, edited by Stephanus. These page numbers and column letters are repeated in all 
modern editions of Plato’s works.
Plato
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Th is will allow us to see the merits of Plato’s late account clearly. We 
will then argue that while modern research has made Plato’s late 
physiology obsolete, some of its important features can be preserved 
in a modernised form. Th is will allow us to see how aspects of his 
theory of the good might be preserved.
Situating Plato’s physiology
Plato’s scientiﬁ c and biological theories were not grounded in empiri-
cal research and may seem odd, eclectic, and antiquated (Lloyd, 1968: 
79–85). It is widely acknowledged that Plato’s biology and physiology 
were inﬂ uenced by existing theories. He had no ﬁ rst-hand experience 
or any collection of case histories on which to rely. However, he does 
seem to have had a deep interest in, and been inﬂ uenced by, both the 
physiological theories of the φυσιολόγοι and contemporary medical 
theory and practice.2 Plato uses some of their fundamental ideas as the 
basis on which he develops his own sophisticated account. By the late 
dialogue Timaeus, Plato gives a comprehensive and systematic physi-
ological theory that includes highly original accounts of digestion, 
nutrition and respiration, and an advanced physics of the elements 
earth, air, ﬁ re and water. 
It is generally accepted that Plato was very familiar with the views 
of the φυσιολόγος Empedocles, whose account of pleasure and pain 
seems to have been standard in Plato’s time. Empedocles had two fun-
damental cosmological principles. One principle was that like acts on 
like. Th e four elements combined in the body (earth, air, ﬁ re, water) 
act on the same elements outside them in the external world. Th e 
other principle was that an organic substance or function requires 
2 The φυσιολόγοι gave proto-scientific explanation of cosmic and natural 
processes by appeal to λόγος (argument) and material causes, often but not 
always in a chance process, instead of by μῦθος (myth). The theories of the 
φυσιολόγοι go far beyond what we would nowadays call physiology, encom-
passing physics, biology and cosmology. To some extent, their theories were 
influenced by observation. 
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a mixture of elements in a proportion proper to that particular sub-
stance or function (Gosling and Taylor, 1982:19–20). An ancient note 
on Empedocles shows that he had a view on pleasure and pain that 
included the notion of desiring. Empedocles says that “pleasures occur 
by [or perhaps ‘to’] likes from likes, and according to what is deﬁ cient 
with a view to the ﬁ lling up, so that that which is deﬁ cient (has) the 
desire for the like’’ (Gosling and Taylor, 1982:21).
Alcmaeon of Croton, a contemporary of Empedocles, claimed that 
health is ἰσονομία (equilibrium) of various powers in the body like 
the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry (Gosling and Taylor, 1982:23). 
Disease occurs when there is a μοναρχία (predominance) of any one 
of these powers. Th is theme was inherited by the Hippocratic school 
of medicine. In their writings health was said to involve a propor-
tion of the elements of the body (Lloyd, 1978:262). Pain and disease 
occur when the balance is upset, producing an excess or a deﬁ ciency 
or separation of one or more elements (Lloyd, 1978:262). Treatments 
employed by the Hippocratics oft en take the form of a purge and spe-
cial diet in an attempt to restore the balance of elements (Lloyd, 1978:
266). Th e Hippocratics had more interest and faith in observation than 
Plato, as their use of case studies suggests. But they also clearly used a 
physiological theory to underpin their empirical data. Th e numerous 
discussions in Plato of the goodness of harmony and proportion sug-
gest that he was impressed by medical theory, as does Plato’s claim that 
philosophy like medicine returns disharmonious and disproportion-
ate bodies, soul, and even states to harmony.3 
Th e physiology of the Gorgias
Th is principle of like’s desire for ﬁ lling with like towards some proper 
proportion of elements is inherited and developed by Plato. In the 
3 Gorgias, 476–480, 500f, 504, 505b 507f, 512, 521, 525. Charmenides, 156c; Phaedrus, 270; 
Symposium, 186cff, 188; Republic, 556e; Timaeus, 82–86a; Philebus, 31d; Laws, 653b, 
691cd; Sophist, 228.
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Gorgias he uses a very simple physiological model to explain pleas-
ures and pains. At 496 pain is identiﬁ ed with ἐπιθυμία (desire) and 
ἔνδεια (want, in the sense of a deﬁ ciency or lack of something). Th e 
πλήρωσις (replenishment or ﬁ lling) of a deﬁ ciency or lack is identiﬁ ed 
with pleasure. As examples Socrates talks of hunger as an ἔνδεια while 
eating is the ﬁ lling of the need or deﬁ ciency and is pleasant. Th e same 
goes for thirst and drinking when thirsty. In both cases pleasure occurs 
as a result of the ﬁ lling of some lack that is painful. At 497c Socrates 
emphasises that once the painful lack has been ﬁ lled the pleasure 
ceases. Plato has Socrates exploit the theory and argue that pleasure 
is, in fact, mixed with pain. Plato has Socrates use the theory to argue 
that eating when hungry is a pleasure mixed with pain (λυπούμενον 
χαίρειν: 496e5) — the pleasure only occurs because there is a lack, and 
all lacks are painful. When the lack is ﬁ lled the pain vanishes and so 
then does the pleasure. 
Plato has Socrates attempt to convince Callicles that the happiest 
man has no wants and neither painful lack nor pleasant ﬁ lling. At 492e 
an unconvinced Callicles likens the presence of neither an in nor out 
ﬂ ow as the life of a stone or corpse. So at 493–494 Socrates tells a story 
originally told by a Sicilian (presumably Empedocles). Th e story is 
about people in Hades who toil endlessly to ﬁ ll their appetites. Th eir 
numerous appetites are said to be like leaky jars, what goes in just as 
quickly ﬂ ows out, much like a bird that was known to defecate while 
eating. Th e passage hints that in some way the ﬁ lling of them should 
be seen as laborious and foolish, and made even more diﬃ  cult because 
their souls are like sieves. At 494b Socrates says that for much to run 
in there must be large holes for it to ﬂ ow out of and at 492e–494b he 
had argued that the temperate man is happier for seeking not an abun-
dance of ﬁ lling but the minimisation of loss. 
Plato continues to develop these points in all his subsequent discus-
sions of the topic. Th e similes and stories he has Socrates recount are 
used to show what Plato takes to be the important consequence of the 
physiological model: that being complete, full, suﬃ  cient, is the end, and 
hence the good. Th e loss of proportion because of deﬁ cit or excess is 
Couvalis, George and Usher, Matthew 2005. Pain and Pleasure in Plato's Physiology. In E. Close, M. Tsianikas 
and G. Frazis (eds.) "Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek 
Studies, Flinders University April 2003", Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 
39-52.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
44
GEORGE COUVALIS AND MATTHEW USHER
bad and the ﬁ lling or correction only instrumentally good. Completion 
and proportion are not attained by maximising the number and size 
of ﬁ llings, as Callicles argues at 492–494, but by the making up of lacks 
towards our proportionate mixtures. On this account some pains are 
instrumental goods, as good as the best pleasures. 
Th e Gorgias is Plato’s ﬁ rst explicit use of a physiologically inspired 
theory to argue for ethical conclusions. However there are a number 
of problems that are immediately apparent with this theory. First, 
lack is treated as identical with want or desire and both are identi-
ﬁ ed with pain. And ﬁ lling, satisfaction, and pleasure are also naively 
thought to be identical. While these things may well occur together 
and are strongly related in some cases, it is possible to conceive of 
situations which do not ﬁ t the model well. Lacking something does 
not always mean we feel a pain or a desire for ﬁ lling. Many lacks 
conceivably go unnoticed, or only come to our attention at a certain 
magnitude, and even then may fail to motivate us. Th e ﬁ lling of lacks 
is not always pleasant, and eating when one is full can be pleasant as 
in the case of dessert. An account of desire seems necessary but none 
is given. At 494c-e when giving an example of scratching an itch 
Socrates seems to switch from talking of lacks and ﬁ llings to desire 
and satisfaction. He does this presumably because it would not make 
sense to conceive of an itch and the scratching of it as some kind 
of lack and ﬁ lling in any straightforward way. Consider the pain of 
a broken arm. According to a theory of lacks and ﬁ llings, the pain 
of the break is a lack that makes possible a healing (a ﬁ lling) which 
must be pleasant, but this seems rather implausible without further 
argument. 
A related problem is that while the simple model used may cover 
some examples it is too thin to adequately account for the huge vari-
ety of things that the terms “pleasure” and “pain” are used to describe. 
Plato uses the terms widely, as is clear from the fact that he treats thirst 
as a painful state. His discussion of the coward’s pain and pleasure at 
498 shows that Plato believes extreme anguish, worry and fear are like 
pains. Yet there is no account of how these pains and pleasures involve 
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the ﬁ lling of lacks. Likewise when one considers the great range of 
things that we call enjoyment, joy, and pleasure, some of them seem 
highly cognitive and not to involve any bodily lack.4 Th e pleasures of a 
good comedy, or of viewing a sculpture, of realising that you have won 
a race, do not seem to ﬁ t the ﬁ lling of deﬁ ciency model. For the same 
reasons the model seems ill equipped to explain the pleasure one gets 
in anticipation of good things like thinking about how much someone 
will be thrilled by the good news you are bringing them, or to account 
for the suﬀ ering from anticipation of bad things.
Th e mind seems to have an important role in desiring and in both 
pleasant and painful experiences but its precise role is left  unexam-
ined in the Gorgias. Socrates says at 496e that pleasure and pain occur 
together at the same time and in the same part of us, whether we call 
it the body or the ψυχή (soul or mind). He talks at 503e–505b and 
at 506d–507 about the role of the ψυχή in desire and in maintaining 
good order and proportion, and subdivides it into two parts, a rational 
part and an unruly and insatiable part. He argues that the good life 
requires organisation of these parts. But the role that the ψυχή plays 
in desiring, and pleasures and pains that do not involve bodily lacks, 
are unexplained.
Th e physiology of the Philebus
Th e more advanced account of pain and pleasure that Plato gives in 
the Philebus comes aft er he has Socrates give some metaphysical foun-
dation for his physiology in the passages from 23b–27c. We hear that 
anything that exists consists of elements and qualities — such as the 
hot, the dry, the cold and the moist — which are characteristic of that 
thing. As examples Socrates at 25e–26c mentions speciﬁ c mixtures 
like health and good climate as mixtures of deﬁ nite and proportion-
ate amounts. Divergences from this proportionate mix are to varying 
degrees bad since they result in things like disease or drought. As 
4 Some of the Greek words he uses are τέρψις, χαίρειν, λύπη, ἄλγος.
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far as the human organism is concerned the κατά φύσιν, our natu-
ral constitution or attunement, is a harmonious and proportionate 
mixture, created by νοῦς (intelligence) in the cosmos, which sets 
πέρας(determination) on things that are ἄπειρον, (indeterminate). At 
29b–30d Socrates says that the ψυχή has a share of the greater cosmic 
νοῦς and just as the cosmic νοῦς establishes order in the cosmos, the 
human ψυχή through the medical art can re-establish order when 
things are disturbed in the body. 
At 28a Socrates puts pain and pleasure in the class of the ἄπειρον, 
the boundless or indeterminate. Th ey are unlimited and indeterminate 
in themselves, ever capable of increase or decrease. What sets limits or 
determination on them is the nature of the being they are associated 
with. At 26d the “oﬀ spring” of πέρας and the ἄπειρον is a γένεσις (a 
becoming) of οὐσία (determinate being). And later at 54c–55 Socrates 
says that as pains and pleasures are γένεσις they have no οὐσία like 
successful mixtures such as the κατά φύσιν, health, good climate and 
even music have. In the case of the human organism the stable main-
tenance of determinate being would be best, but this is not possible 
because of the nature of humankind. At 42c–43c Socrates says that 
we are constantly shift ing in state and always subject to disturbances 
and the return from such disturbances. Th e κατά φύσιν once attained, 
is not furthered by passing beyond all limits. Th is leads only to a lack 
in οὐσία which is disproportion, disease and in the most severe cases, 
death.
Having argued for this metaphysical basis, Plato in the passages 
31a–53c now focuses on the physiology of pains and pleasures. At 
31d–32b he has Socrates speak broadly of the disruption of harmony in 
living creatures as painful, while the reverse, return towards harmony, 
is pleasant. At 31e hunger and thirst are described as disintegration and 
pain, while the πλήρωσις is pleasure. Socrates immediately elaborates, 
stating that when the body is heated or chilled we have a λύσις (disso-
lution) which is painful while the process of recovery to normal tem-
perature and οὐσία is pleasant. With the metaphysical discussion fresh 
in mind, at 32a–b Socrates sums up as succinctly as he can:
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When the κατά φύσιν of πέρας and ἄπειρον that forms a living organism 
is φθορά (destroyed), this destruction is pain, while the return towards its 
own nature, this general restoration from destruction is pleasure.
If we recall the simple discussion of lacks and ﬁ llings in the Gorgias we 
see that here Socrates speaks of more than just the ﬁ lling of physical 
lacks. He also speaks of the destruction and dissolution of the natural 
constitution, and of its restoration. He broadens the notion of lack and 
ﬁ lling. For instance, at 35e he has Socrates speak of pleasures and pains 
as both emptyings and ﬁ llings related to the preservation and destruc-
tion of animals. 
One of the obvious advances is that there is now a clear distinction 
between lack, desire, and pain, and between replenishment, satisfac-
tion, and pleasure. Later in the Philebus, Plato modiﬁ es this model fur-
ther by making perception by the ψυχή the essential part of pleasure 
and pain. At 42c–43a Socrates says that while there are always emp-
tyings and ﬁ llings, decay and growth, separations and combinations, 
from and to the κατά φύσιν due to the continual ﬂ ux, they are not 
always perceived. At 33d–34a Socrates acknowledges the existence of a 
neutral state where the movements, though they are going on, are not 
perceived, the ψυχή being oblivious to them. At all times a human is 
deviating from determinate being. But not all deviations are perceived. 
When they are it is because there is αἴσθησις, a perception or aﬀ ection 
of both the body and ψυχή described as a σεισμός (disturbance) that 
aﬀ ects both. 
Two important points are established by the introduction of percep-
tion. Th e ﬁ rst is that there is now a clear distinction between what are, 
broadly speaking, disturbances (lacks and dissolutions) and pain, and 
between restoration (ﬁ llings and returns from disturbance) and pleas-
ure. Plato accounts for the fact that we are not always aware of every 
disturbance and restoration by saying that we are oblivious to many of 
them. However, he still argues that some pleasures are really pain and 
pleasure mixtures, since there is perception of both disturbance and 
restoration, and he calls these a kind of false pleasure and pain. At 
44c–50d he has Socrates give a medical-sounding critique of these 
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mixed pleasure and pain states, and it is argued that the mixture makes 
for intensity. Th ey depend on antithetic processes that may be in the 
body, or in the body and the ψυχή or just in the ψυχή. Th e replenish-
ment and pleasure is more intense because of the concurrent lack or 
disturbance. Interestingly Plato at 47d–48b has Socrates include many 
emotional states in this category, such as rage, lamentation, and spite. 
At 50e–55b Plato also has Socrates discuss some pleasures and pains 
that are pure and true since they occur without the perception of the 
antithetical disturbance in the case of true pleasures or restoration in 
the case of true pains. 
Th e other important advance in the Philebus is that Plato gives a 
sophisticated and insightful account of the role of the ψυχή in desiring. 
He emphasises the role of the ψυχή in pleasures and pains of the body 
and introduces pleasures and pains which are only of the ψυχή. Th ey are 
not attended by disturbance or recovery in the body but are the pleas-
ant or painful anticipations by the ψυχή of disturbance and recovery. In 
describing these pleasures and pains however, Plato has Socrates return 
to the description of pain as lack, and pleasure as the ﬁ lling of lack. Th is 
may be because he wants his physiological account to tie in with his 
metaphysical claims that lacks and ﬁ llings are not οὐσία but γένεσις.
In the passages 34e–36c Plato has Socrates discuss several psy-
chic functions that are involved in all pains and pleasures. Crucially 
important is the discussion at 34a of memory as the preservation of 
perceptions. Memory is linked with desire, a painful πάθος (aﬀ ection) 
of the ψυχή that involves remembering what objects or conditions 
would fulﬁ l the lack. Th e passages at 35b–d make clear that hunger, 
for example, is not only a perception by the mind of emptiness in the 
body, it also has within it the desire (a painful state) for the object of 
replenishment corresponding to the lack.5 At 34b Socrates states that 
in addition to being the seat of desire and memory the ψυχή is capa-
ble, through recollection, of re-experiencing a past pain or pleasure, 
5 Excepting young children and infants, 35a–36c. See also Couvalis and Usher 2003b for 
differences in pain experience in children.
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and can thus re-experience by itself what it has experienced with the 
body. 
What Plato seems to be arguing is that pleasures and pains are 
intentional (object directed) states. Th is makes more plausible pleas-
ures of the ψυχή like the anticipation of good things, or the suﬀ er-
ing of mental or emotional pains from fear of anticipated evils. Th e 
ψυχή being in pain because of some perceived lack can anticipate the 
coming restoration and enjoy it in the certainty of expectation. Th is 
attribute and function of the ψυχή means we can have radically false 
pleasures and pains, where there is the perception of pleasantness or 
painfulness even though there is, in fact, no lack or replenishment 
going on. Th ese pleasures and pains are discussed in the passages 36c-
41a. Th ey are said to accompany both true and false memories, beliefs 
and judgements, all of which make discourses in the ψυχή. Many of 
these discourses are hopes and fancies about the future and the past. 
Many also concern the present. At 42a the falseness of a discourse is 
said to “imbue” the pleasures and pains with their own condition. If 
our judgement about our being restored or depleted is false, it makes 
the pleasures and pains mere caricatures of true pleasures and pains. 
Can Plato’s account be modernised?
Plato’s account in the Philebus of pleasure and pain constitutes a con-
siderable advance on his previous account and, it seems, on preceding 
Greek accounts. However, modern research on pain has made clear 
that Plato is wrong to identify paradigmatic pain, like cutting your 
ﬁ nger with a knife, with perception of a lack or of disintegration.
Th e two kinds of ﬁ bres which are most important in paradigmatic 
pain transmit electrical signals from the skin to the spinal cord and 
brain. A delta ﬁ bres, which are surrounded by a substance called 
myelin, transmit signals extremely quickly. C ﬁ bres, which are unmy-
elinated, transmit signals relatively slowly. Both types of ﬁ bres respond 
preferentially or solely to stimuli which damage tissue or are such that 
any small increase in their activity would damage tissue. Ad ﬁ bres are 
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more specialised than C ﬁ bres. For instance, there are Ad ﬁ bres which 
preferentially respond to strong mechanical stimulation, there are 
those which respond to temperatures above 45° Celsius and below 
23° Celsius, and there are those which respond to irritant chemicals. C 
ﬁ bres typically respond to all three kinds of stimuli. However, C ﬁ bres 
oft en provide information which allows us to work out the precise 
location of a painful stimulus on the surface of the skin (Grahek, 2001:
140). Some C ﬁ bres are particularly sensitive to chemicals released 
aft er injury. Th eir activity is involved in the tenderness which spreads 
around the damaged part of the body, promoting conditions that aid 
in healing, resting the injured part for example (Grahek, 2001:134–35). 
Th e ﬁ ring of Ad ﬁ bres is important in immediate acute pain. Th e ﬁ ring 
of C ﬁ bres is important in chronic pain. Neither type of ﬁ bre responds 
to lacks in the body or person.
Nevertheless, there are a number of important points in Plato’s 
account that are on the right track. We have pointed out elsewhere that 
modern research bears out some signiﬁ cant points in Plato’s account 
of the painfulness of pain. As Plato thought, the painfulness of pain 
cannot be plausibly identiﬁ ed with pain sensations, but is most plau-
sibly understood to be a cognitively sophisticated state, analogous to a 
belief. (In modern philosophical jargon, it is a propositional attitude.) 
In addition, the same kinds of emotional states that are involved in the 
painfulness of paradigmatic pains seem to be involved in the painful-
ness of non-paradigmatic pains (Couvalis and Usher, 2003a, 2003b). A 
further way in which Plato might be right is that it may be the case that 
the nature of paradigmatic pain can only be deﬁ ned via an account 
of its normal or proper function, which is to preserve the body from 
damage and disintegration. Th e nature of pain cannot be grasped 
merely by considering its sensory characteristics. Nikola Grahek has 
recently argued that if paradigmatic pain is to be properly deﬁ ned, 
even its sensory characteristics must be understood to be indicators 
of potential bodily damage (Grahek, 2001:144–45) While this view has 
not yet been adequately defended in the literature, it is by no means 
out of the question.
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Plato is attracted to a rather odd model in which pain is a percep-
tion of a lack or of disintegration because Plato would like to say that 
pleasure is not itself the good, and that if it is a good, it is at best a 
remedial good. He would like to say that pleasure itself cannot be the 
rational ultimate end of our actions because it is a kind of perception 
which is not even the perception of something which really has οὐσία. 
It is the perception that determinate being is coming into existence 
(being restored). Th e pleasantness of pleasure is due to the fact that it 
is perceived that a process is being completed. For instance, the pleas-
antness involved in drinking water if we are thirsty is a perception that 
we are being restored to our proper state as human beings via a proc-
ess which is directed to this τέλος (end). When we have been restored, 
the pleasure ceases. Th e τέλεον (ﬁ nished, perfect) state is one in which 
we feel no pleasure or pain. To help him say something like this Plato 
conceives of pain as a perception of a disintegrated state which lacks 
determinate being. While we have seen that Plato cannot say this, he 
might be able to say that paradigmatic pain is a kind of perception 
that something is threatening to disintegrate us. On this account, pain 
would be the perception of the threat of disintegration into the inde-
terminate.
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